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Abstract

We use a laboratory experiment to compare general equilibrium economies in
which agents individually allocate their private goods among consumption,
investment in production and maintenance of a depreciating public facility. The
public facility is financed either by voluntary anonymous contributions (VAC) or
taxes. We find that rates of taxation chosen by majority vote remain at an
intermediate level, converging neither to zero nor to 100%, and the experimental
economies sustain public goods at levels between the finite- and infinite-horizon
optima. This contrasts with a rapid decline of public goods under voluntary
anonymous contributions (VAC). Both the payoff efficiency and production of
private goods are higher when taxes are set endogenously instead of being fixed at
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1. Introduction
Given the prevalence and importance of public goods in society, ways of
financing their production have attracted much interest. 1 Game theoretic models
suggest that egoistic individuals have little reason to finance production of public
goods through individual voluntary anonymous contributions (VAC). Laboratory
public good experiments tend initially to yield average contributions around 50
percent of the collective optimum, gradually declining towards a 5-20 percent
range.
There is little reason for society to confine its search for efficient solutions
for the pervasive problem of financing the provision of public goods (PGs) and
common pool resources (CPRs) to only VACs. Institutions may evolve to address
various problems of economizing through socio-political and economic processes
of adjustment, experimentation, and feedback over rules, expectations, and
conventions. It is reasonable to conjecture that the scope of such social evolution
includes the provision of PGs and CPRs. In modern democratic societies taxes, set
by an elected government, are the most common way to finance such goods. 2 We
therefore explore how efficient the provision of PGs is in a system with taxes set

1

For surveys of the substantial pre-1995 literature on experimental gaming with public
goods see Ledyard (1995) and Bergstom et al. (1986). From considerable literature since then, we
mention only a few. Fehr and Gächter (2000) consider public goods experiments without
punishment for free riding; Brandts and Schram (2001) consider voluntary contribution
mechanisms for public goods; Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997) consider public goods provision where
the individuals have different marginal values for their private goods; Ahn et al. (2009) present an
experiments on endogenous group sizes; Hatzipanayotou and Michael (2001) deal with public
goods, tax policies and unemployment in less developed countries. Modeling in the last of these
papers is closer to the spirit of our own emphasis on the importance of institutional structures in
the economy.
2

Capital cost of creating a new public good facility is typically considerably more than the cost to
operate and maintain an existing facility. The two may also differ in their political feasibility. In
the present model and experiment, we confine ourselves to consideration of financing the
operation and maintenance of an existing public good facility in absence of uncertainty; smooth
incremental additions to stock are assumed to be feasible.
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by subjects through a vote. In an additional treatment subjects can also vote on
whether they want to implement a system with taxes or with VACs.
Walker et al. (2000) seem to have been the first to consider the efficiency
implications of a combined common-property-with-voting allocation scheme in
the laboratory. They reported that voting on the use of a CPR is more efficient
than appropriation of the resource by individual members of the group. In most
cases proposals adopted by vote are socially optimal, indicating that groups can
coordinate on efficient use of a CPR. Already Ostrom et al. (1992) showed that
communication in a CPR-game significantly increased average net yield.
Magreiter et al. (2005) studied asymmetric endowments and found that
homogeneity makes efficient agreement more likely. However, the commonproperty setting of these three studies is quite distinct from the public good we
explore here. Kroll et al. (2007) employ a more familiar public-goods setting and
report that voting by itself does not promote cooperation; the ability of voters to
punish defectors does. With perfect enforcement they observed 100 percent
contribution rates in most periods. While these results are useful, contributions or
a tax of 100 percent are neither realistic nor desirable in practice. In the present
study, we explore an economy with private and public goods where voting is used
to determine the tax rate in a setting where the optimum rates of consumption and
taxation lie at an intermediate level.
Prior experimental studies (see Carpenter 2000, for an overview) have
observed cooperation where conventional theory predicts it will not occur. We
also build on studies of experimental production economies with taxation, e.g.,
Riedl and van Winden (2007). The endogenous taxation through voting is similar
to the work of Sutter and Weck-Hannemann (2003, 2004). In our process-oriented
strategic market game the maintenance of an existing public goods is financed
through a tax on private income. The unique equilibrium solution for any given
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tax rate yields an optimal consumption/investment policy for each individual.
General dynamic programming analysis of our basic model enables us to solve for
an optimal rate of taxation for society as a whole. 3
We set up and examine a model economy in the laboratory under two sets
of conditions: (1) when the tax rate is exogenously fixed at the theoretical
optimum (knowable only to an omniscient government); and (2) when the rate of
taxation is set and adjusted through a democratic voting process. As a comparison
and bridge to existing literature, we also examine the performance of otherwise
identical economies in which taxation is replaced by individual VACs. In a
supplementary treatment we let the subjects choose between VACs and taxation
systems by majority vote.
Our 2x2 (+2) design has four main and two supplemental treatments (see
Table 1). Of the four, Treatment 1 has a given tax rate and the starting stock of the
public good is at the GE optimum, contrasted with starting at 50 percent of the
optimum in Treatment 2. The taxation is set exogenously at the theoretical
optimal level to maintain the optimal stock of the public good facility in both
cases. 4 In Treatments 3 and 4, the tax rate is set endogenously through subjects’
vote (at the median choice) once every five periods, starting with optimal and
suboptimal public facility levels in Treatments 3 and 4, respectively.
In order to compare and contrast our results with the voluminous VAC
literature, we supplement our 2x2 experimental design with treatment T0 which
starts with the optimal level of PGs (as in Treatments 1 and 3), but taxation is
3
Appendix A presents an EXCEL-sheet (the infinite-horizon model can be found at
http://www.uibk.ac.at/ibf/mitarbeiter/huberj/model_infinite_online-material.xls, while the finitehorizon model is at http://www.uibk.ac.at/ibf/mitarbeiter/huberj/model_finite_online-material.xls)
which allows one to manipulate different input variables of the model and see the charts of
respective changes in utility and other variables.
4
For the basic model of tax-financed public goods, see Karatzas et al. 2006..
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replaced by VACs. In the second supplemental treatment, T5, we aim to capture a
part of the dynamics of the political process by letting the subjects choose
between the VAC and taxation systems by a majority vote, and implementing
their chosen regime.
We find that the four main treatments with finite horizon experimental
economies sustain public goods between the finite- and infinite-horizon optima,
and exhibit 90 to 100 percent efficiency. Efficiency and production of private
goods are higher when the rate of taxation is determined by voting compared to
being fixed at the GE optimum. In the two voting treatments taxes remain at an
intermediate level, converging neither to zero nor to 100%. Irrespective of
whether we start at 50% or 100% of the optimum, the stock of the public good
converges near the same level between the infinite- and finite-horizon optima.
This holds also in the supplemental treatment T5 in which the majority chose
taxation regime over VACs 23 out of 24 times. In all except the VAC treatments,
the ending stock of public goods exceeds the finite horizon optimum. We also
find that the share of total earnings derived from the public good is higher in the
taxation-treatments; in VAC treatments most earnings come from direct
consumption of the private good. Total production of private goods is not reduced
by taxes, and is highest when subjects can choose the tax rate endogenously
(compared to VACs or externally fixed tax rate). These results from a general
equilibrium laboratory economy suggest that taxation is an efficient social
institution to address the problem of under-production of public goods through
voluntary contributions. The model and experimental design are presented in
Section 2, followed by results, and a discussion in the subsequent sections of the
paper.
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2. A Dynamic Equilibrium Model of an Economy with a Public
Good and its Experimental Implementation
We consider a version of Samuelson's (1954) pure public good embedded
in a parallel dynamic programming control process that has been solved for its
type-symmetric non-cooperative (rational expectations) equilibrium for any tax
rate (see Karatzas et al. 2011). 5 The dynamic structure of the game also includes a
government and voting.
The basic model involves the maintenance of a depreciating public good
facility such as a transportation or sewage system (see Karatzas et al. 2006 for a
description). 6 The game has a government and n individual agents; each agent is
initially endowed with a quantity of private goods and money (a, m). The
government is endowed with G units of the public good and M units of money at
the outset. It also has the right to collect as tax a fraction θ of individuals' income
from the sale of private goods, and a production function that transforms the
private goods bought from tax revenues into the public good. 7
A move by an agent i in any period t is to decide how much money to bid
(bti) to buy private goods in the market 8 and, after she receives the private good
from the market, how much to consume and how much to put into production for

5

Formally, with a continuum of agents we solved for any tax level; then after solving this set with
taxation level as a parameter we solved for the optimum from the point of view of a benevolent
central government. The theory approximates equilibrium as though the number of agents is large
enough that they have no influence on the price. Use of n =10 in the experiment, ignores the
presence of a small oligopolistic influence.
6
It also could be a wage-supported bureaucracy that provides a self-policing system for the
economy. Although bureaucracy could be one of the most important and earliest of costs of public
goods, it is rarely mentioned in discussions of public goods.
7
Even at this level of simplicity, given that production takes time, there are accounting questions
to be considered in the definition of periodic income and profits. In a stationary equilibrium the
timing differences disappear.
8
In the experiment all money is automatically bid, so bit=mit.
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the following period. Figure 1 gives a time line of what happens within one
period.
Insert Figure 1 about here
A period begins with government in possession of taxes gathered in the
preceding period in the form of money (M in period 1), the n agents carrying their
after-tax money balances from the previous period (m in period 1), and the units
of the private good they produced at the end of the previous period (a in period 1).
We use a sell-all market mechanism, in which individuals' entire balance of
private goods is automatically offered for sale in a market (see Huber et al. 2010
for properties of the sell-all mechanism). In the experiment each individual
automatically bids his total money balance b to buy the private good from the
market. The government also bids all its money balance 𝑏𝑏� for the private good. A
price p is computed as the ratio of the total money bid (by agents and the
government) divided by the total number of units of private goods available.
The fixed money supply in the economy in conjunction with the sell-all market
game imposes a good deal of regularity on price dynamics: If aggregate
production increases (decreases), then the price must fall (rise). We see this as a
virtue as it promotes order in an environment with a lot of moving parts (money,
private goods, public goods, taxation, production, and consumption), and permits
sharper focus on the question of efficient provision of public goods under
taxation.
The quantity of private goods the government and individual agents get
equals the money they bid divided by the price of the private good (ki = bi/p units
for individual i; 𝑘𝑘 = 𝑏𝑏�⁄𝑝𝑝 units for the government). Each agent, being a producer

as well as a consumer, divides the units bought between consumption and
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production. 9 In addition, each agent receives the price multiplied by the number
of units sold as his income in units of money. This money income is taxed at a
uniform tax rate, either pre-set to the optimum rate θ = 21.5% (in Treatments 1
and 2) or set endogenously through a vote by subjects (in Treatments 3 and 4),
where all subjects pay the median of the tax rates proposed by individuals.
The n producer/consumer agents have a concave private good production
function f(k) = 80*k0.25 with a one period production time lag, and a payoff
function of the form u(x, G) = (x + G/4), with x being the consumption of private
goods and G being the stock of public goods. We calibrated the game so that in
equilibrium roughly half of the expected earnings come from the public good and
the other half from private consumption.
Before the end of the period the stock of the public good is depreciated by
10%. The government then uses all k units of private good it buys to produce F(k)
= 2*k0.5 units of the public good which is added to the stock of the public good at
the beginning of the next period. Depreciation is a fixed percentage of the level
of capital stock – in the experiment we use 10 percent depreciation rate. The
government carries the tax collected as money balance to the following period to
buy private goods. In equilibrium the production of public goods precisely covers
depreciation, otherwise the amount of the stock of the public good changes. This
describes one full period of the game. Holdings of the goods (public and private)
and cash are carried over from one period to the next in all treatments.
In implementing an experimental game with a finite termination we are
faced with the question of how to value the stock of public good and money
holdings at the end of the game. With zero valuation, we expect that the

9

In this respect our experiment is similar to Lei and Noussair’s (2002) growth experiment; the
same subjects simultaneously play the roles of both the firm and the consumer.
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maintenance of the public good facility will tend to drop off towards the end of
experimental sessions. We set up an Excel sheet to numerically solve the dynamic
program when the value of the stock of public good is zero at the end of the
session (see footnote 3 and Appendix A). The results obtained from this
optimization are labeled “finite horizon” to distinguish them from the “infinite
horizon” results throughout the paper. The terminal or “salvage value” of left over
money, goods and the public good are all zero. Subjects are instructed that the
session will end with 1/6th chance each after period 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, or 30. 10
Instructions given to subjects are included as Appendix B. Instructions
supplemented by trial rounds allowed subjects to gain a reasonable understanding
of the decisions they had to make, the opportunity sets from which various
decisions had to be chosen, and how their own and others’ decisions were linked
to their payoffs. It is unlikely, and almost impossible, for any subjects to have
fully understood the mathematical structure and properties of the model economy
in this experiment (or for that matter, in most experiments where the
mathematical structure is nontrivial). It is not the purpose of the experiment to
assess the cognitive capacities of subjects to intuitively arrive at optimal solutions
to stochastic dynamic programs; that would be outside the scope of this paper, and
fall into cognitive psychology or psychological economics. Our aim is only to
find out if the mathematical solutions provide a reasonable neighborhood of
attraction for aggregate outcomes of the economies populated with agents having
abilities and mild incentives of ordinary people.
We consider a multi-period dynamic model of a durable public good as
representative of many situations in a modern mass economy. In doing so, several
10

For the equilibrium calculations presented in the results section we used 1/6th change of ending
the game after each of the periods 25 to 30. In the experiment we ran the first session with a
random termination, which happened to be after period 26. For better comparability and ease of
exposition in figures all other sessions were also ended after this period.
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subtle difficulties appear. In particular before optimality can be well defined, the
cost of the path to an equilibrium as well as the efficient yield at equilibrium must
be taken into account. If the future has little value and the maintenance of a public
good is costly, one might as well forego maintenance in favor of immediate
consumption. In our experiment this was avoided by selecting no discount on the
future. 11 A further experimental difficulty occurs as the experiment time horizon is
finite. We expect and empirically find some drop off near the end of the play as
the remaining public goods are of no further value.

Implementation of the experiment
The experiment consists of variations on the regime to finance a public
good (fixed tax, endogenous tax, VAC) and the initial stock of the public good the
economy is endowed with (optimum, half of optimum) in a 2x2 + 2 design (see
Table 1).
Insert Table 1 about here
The variations in the regime are:
•

Control treatment T0 in which subjects make voluntary anonymous
contributions (VAC) for production of the public good. This treatment
serves as a benchmark for comparison with the results from experimental
literature on VAC partial equilibrium economies.

•

Exogenously fixed tax rate (at optimal level of 21.5%) in regimes T1 and
T2. In T1 (and T3), the starting level of the stock of public good is at its
steady state (i.e., infinite horizon) optimum of 427. However, it cannot be

11

With zero discount rate the payoffs of a dynamic program may become unbounded; in our
experiment this can be handled by maximizing the average payoff per period.
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taken for granted that a government can identify and build the optimal
public facilities at the optimal level in the first place. In order to assess the
dynamic ability of the system to adjust when the starting point is not at the
optimum, we use Treatment T2 (and T4) in which the starting level is 50%
of the steady state optimum.
•

Whether governments have the ability or incentives to set the rate of
taxation at the optimal level is, at the very least, controversial. We
therefore contrast the results of optimal exogenous tax rate economies (T1
and T2) against economies with an endogenously determined tax rate
(median of individual proposals) in regimes T3 and T4; and

•

Institutional evolution through voting between VAC and taxation regimes
in T5.
In T3 and T4 the exogenously imposed tax rate of T1 and T2 is replaced

with a rate determined by a vote of the participants every five periods. Each
subject submits a tax proposal and the median of the ten proposals is chosen as
the rate of taxation applied to all subjects for five periods, until the next vote is
taken. Agents therefore have the collective freedom to increase or reduce the
provision for public goods through voting.
In T5 subjects first experience five periods with VAC (setup of T0) and
then five periods with taxes (setup of T3). Then the treatment starts where
subjects collectively decide by majority vote whether they want to implement
VAC or taxes for the next five periods. 12 The selected mechanism is implemented
for five periods, until the next vote is taken.
Table 2 gives the values of the parameters of the experiment. The resulting
stationary (i.e., infinite horizon) equilibrium price is p = 27.67. Each individual
12

One institution was picked randomly in one occurrence of a 5:5 tie.
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should buy 170 units of the private good and consume 68.27%, i.e., 116 units,
while the remaining 54 units are put into production to produce 80*540.25 = 217
units for the next period. The government buys 467.7 units of the private good to
produce 2*467.70.5 = 43.25 units of the public good which is just enough to offset
the depreciation (10% of 427 units) of the equilibrium stock of the public good.
Table 2 about here
We conducted a total of 26 independent runs, each with a different cohort
of 10 subjects for a total of 260 subjects. All subjects were BA or MA students in
Management or Economics at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. All sessions
were carried out using a program written in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and
recruitment was done with ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Average duration of a session
was approximately 60 minutes and average earnings were 15 Euros.

3. Hypotheses
This laboratory experiment explores several key questions: (1) how VAC
and taxation regimes affect the provision of a public good; (2) whether the tax
rates determined by popular vote tend towards zero over time; (3) whether the
steady state stock of public good depends on the initial conditions; (4) whether the
efficiency of the system is affected by the regime for provision of a public good.
Based on the literature discussed in the introductory section, we set up these
questions in the form of null hypotheses of “no difference”. Most of the tests
(except on the stock of public good) are conducted on data from the final five
periods of each run in order to avoid undue influence of any end-of-the-session
effects; we use data for the final period for the stock of the public good because it
is a cumulative and stable magnitude.
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Insert Table 3 here

3.1. Endogenously set tax rates:
Null Hypothesis Ia: Endogenously determined tax rates stabilize near the
optimal level.
Alternative Hypothesis Ia: Endogenously determined tax rates are below
the optimal level.
Null Hypothesis Ib: Endogenously determined tax rates are zero.
Alternative Hypothesis Ib: Endogenously determined tax rates remain
above zero.
Paying low or no taxes leaves more for private consumption initially, but
ends up hurting everyone when the stock of the public good is depleted. An
economy that attains general equilibrium optimum will generate tax rates near
21.5 under null hypothesis Ia. The alternative is low tax rates below the optimum
level. This hypothesis is tested on data from Treatments T3 and T4. In the
extreme tax rates may be zero. This is explored with Hypothesis Ib.

3.2 Public Good Provisioning under VAC and Endogenous Taxation
Null Hypothesis II: There is no difference between provision of public
goods under taxes and VAC regimes.
Alternative Hypothesis II: Taxation results in higher provision of public
goods than VAC.
This hypothesis is tested on data from Treatments T1 to T4 vs. T0. Most VAC
literature reports low contributions to public good; if endogenously determined
tax rates are an effective solution to the problem, we should expect to reject the
null hypothesis in favor of the alternative.
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3.3. Dependence of public good provision on initial conditions
Null Hypothesis IIIa: The final level of the public good does not depend on
initial endowment of the public good.
Alternative Hypothesis IIIa: The final level of the public good is higher
when the initial endowment is higher.
Null Hypothesis IIIb: The final level of the public good does not depend on
whether it is financed by fixed or endogenously determined tax rates.
Alternative Hypothesis IIIb: The final level of the public good is higher
when it is financed by a tax rate fixed at the optimum level.
Null Hypothesis IIIc: The final level of the public good does not depend on
whether it is financed by taxes or VAC.
Alternative Hypothesis IIIc: The final level of the public good is higher
when it is financed by taxes instead of VAC.
Null Hypothesis IIId: Variation in the final level of the public good across
multiple sessions of treatments T1 and T3 (and across multiple treatments
of T2 and T4) is equal.
Alternative Hypothesis IIId: Variation in the final level of the public good
across multiple sessions of treatments T1 is lower than in T3 (and is lower
in T2 than in T4.
The four sub-versions of this hypothesis are tested on the stock of the
public good in the last period. We use data from (a) Treatment T1 vs. T2 and T3
vs. T4; (b) Treatment T1 vs. T3 and T2 vs. T4; (c) four comparisons of T0 against
T1, T2, T3, and T4, respectively; and (d) two comparisons between T1 and T3
and between T2 and T4.
Rejection of null hypothesis IIIa suggests that the tendency of this
economy to go to its equilibrium depends on the initial conditions. Rejection of
null hypothesis IIIb suggests that endogeneity of tax rate determination matters.
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There are strong theoretical arguments why subjects should be expected to vote
for rather low tax rates (below GE level), but on the other hand earlier
experimental evidence (e.g. Kroll et al., 2007) suggests high tax rates when taxes
are enforceable (as they are in our case). Hence we have no clear expectation on
this hypothesis. Rejection of null hypothesis IIIc suggests that the financing
regimes for public goods matter for its steady state level. Rejection of null
hypothesis IIId suggests that the extra degree of freedom in endogenous tax rate
treatments adds to additional variability in data.
3.4.Efficiency:
We measure efficiency of the economy as the total points earned by all
participating subjects in a session as a percentage of the number of points they
would have earned if the economies had achieved the infinite horizon (steady
state) general equilibrium outcomes. Here we use average efficiency across the
last five periods.
Null Hypothesis IVa: Efficiency is the same irrespective of the initial
endowment of the public good.
Alternative Hypothesis IVa: Efficiency is lower when the initial
endowment of the public good is sub-optimal.
Null Hypothesis IVb: Efficiency is the same irrespective of fixed or
endogenous tax rates.
Alternative Hypothesis IVb: Efficiency is lower when tax rates are
determined endogenously.
Null Hypothesis IVc: Efficiency is the same irrespective of public good
financing by taxation or VAC.
Alternative Hypothesis IVc: Last period efficiency is lower when the
public good is financed by VAC.
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Hypothesis IVa is tested by comparing data from treatments T1 vs. T2 and
T3 vs. t4. Hypothesis IVb is tested by comparing data from two pairs of
treatments T1 vs. T3 and T2 vs. T4. Hypothesis IVc is tested by comparing data
from four pairs of treatments T0 vs. T1, T2, T3, and T4.
3.5. Production of the private good
Null Hypothesis Va: Production of the private good is the same
irrespective of fixed or endogenous tax rates.
Alternative Hypothesis Va: Production of the private good is different with
fixed or endogenous tax rates.
Null Hypothesis Vb: Production of the private good is the same
irrespective of public good being financed by taxation or VAC.
Alternative Hypothesis Vb: Production of the private good is not the same
when the public good is financed by taxation or VAC.
These two null hypotheses are given a two-tailed test because there is not
relevant indication on the direction of deviation from the null in the earlier
literature.
3.6. Decomposition of earnings from public goods and private consumption
Null Hypothesis VIa: Initial endowment makes no difference to the
percentage of earnings from the public good.
Alternative Hypothesis VIa: Optimum level of initial endowment of public
good yields a higher percentage of earnings from the public good.
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Null Hypothesis VIb: The method of determining tax rate (endogenously
or fixed) makes no difference to the percentage of earnings from the public
good.
Alternative Hypothesis VIb: Endogenously determined tax rates generate
a lower percentage of earnings from the public good.
Null Hypothesis VIc: Financing of public good by taxation or VAC makes
no difference to the percentage of earnings from the public good.
Alternative Hypothesis VIc: Financing of public good by VAC results in a
lower percentage of earnings from the public good.

3.7. Democratic Choice of Financing Regime
Null Hypothesis VII: There is no preference between financing the public
good by VAC or taxation when citizens are given a chance to decide by
popular vote.
Alternative Hypothesis VII: Subjects prefer taxation over VAC for
financing the public good when citizens are given a chance to decide by
popular vote.
The alternative hypothesis is consistent with the findings of Gürerk et al.
(2006).

4. Results from the Experiment
Results of the experiment are organized and presented in Figures 2-7 as
well as in tests of the seven hypotheses stated above. Each of Figures 2-6 charts a
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single measure of the outcomes of the multiple independent sessions of
experimental economies with different subjects participating in each session of
the four main treatments T1, T2, T3, and T4, as well as the supplemental
treatment T0 (thin chain-dotted lines in the two left panels of each figure). Thick
dashed lines in black and green show general equilibrium predictions for infinite
and finite horizon economies as theoretical benchmarks for comparison. 13 Since
these experimental economies are known to the subjects to last for a finite number
of periods, strictly speaking, the thick green dashed line for finite horizon
equilibrium is the appropriate benchmark for comparing the empirical data.
However, we add the thick black dashed line for infinite horizon equilibrium as an
additional benchmark in case subjects ignore the impending end of the economy
until close to the end.

4.1. Endogenously set Tax Rates (Figure 2)
The two top panels of Figure 2 are empty because the tax rate was
exogenously fixed at 21.5 percent in Treatments 1 and 2. In the left bottom panel
for Treatment 3 (with the initial stock of public good at steady state level 427) the
endogenously determined tax rate usually remained below 21.5 percent and
declined from a range of 17.5-22 (average 19.8) in the first vote to 5-22.5 percent
(average 14.3) in the sixth and final vote. Note that the finite horizon optimal tax
rate (broken thick curved line) declines from 25% to near zero, because the
terminal conditions assign zero value to the stock of public good at the end of the
session. The endogenously determined tax rates do decline but not as rapidly; they
lie between the finite- and infinite-horizon optima.

13

For the finite horizon benchmark each of periods 25 to 30 was assumed to have 1/6th probability
of being the last period, as was also stated in instructions to subjects.

page 18

Figure 2 about here
In Treatment 4 (right bottom panel) the endogenously determined tax rates
also declined slightly from range 11-23 (average 18.3 percent) in the first vote to
8-23 (average 16.3 percent) in the sixth and final vote. Compared to the finite
horizon benchmark, subjects chose marginally higher tax rates, which supported a
rise in the stock of public goods from the initial suboptimal level.
In all 12 endogenous taxation economies, agents voted to pay taxes higher
than the finite horizon optimum in the second half of the sessions, and taxes
clearly did not approach the extreme values of zero or 100%, as in earlier VAC
public goods literature. The Null hypothesis Ia, on the tax rates stabilizing near
the optimal (versus declining towards zero) is rejected when all tax rates are
compared to the optimum of 21.5%. However, when testing each of the twelve
votes (six for each of T3 and T4) separately, the null is rejected seven times and
not rejected five times (among them the first vote in each of T3 and T4). Hence,
while the null of Hypothesis Ia is overall rejected we have to acknowledge that
tax rates were close to the infinite-horizon optimum in almost half of the
individual votes. As for Hypothesis Ib: not a single vote yielded a tax rate of zero.
An enforced tax that is equal for all does not lead to a break-down as is usually
observed in VAC public goods experiments.

4.2 VACs vs. Taxation (Figure 2)
The chain-dotted lines in the left panel of Figure 2 show the realized
VACs as a percentage of individual income in the two sessions of Treatment 0.
Contributions dropped steadily over time, asymptotically approaching zero, and
remained less than the finite- as well as infinite-horizon optima throughout. This
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is consistent with the results of prior laboratory experiments with voluntary
anonymous contributions for public goods. Null hypothesis II, stating that
treatments with taxes lead to the same average contributions than the treatment
with VACs is clearly rejected in favor of the alternative for all periods, as well as
the data from the final five periods (Wilcoxon-signed ranks tests, p-values
<0.01). 14

4.3. Stock of Public Good (Figure 3)
Next we explore the development of the stock of the public good over
time and test whether it differs between treatments near the end of the
experimental sessions. The top left panel in Figure 3 shows the time series of the
stock of public good observed during the four independent sessions of Treatment
T1 (with tax rate fixed at 21.5%, starting with the optimal stock 427 of the public
good at the beginning of Period 1). Time paths of the stock of public good for
each of the four sessions are shown in thin solid grey lines and the mean of the
four paths is shown in a thick solid black line. Given the small dispersion of the
four paths around the mean, the latter captures their central tendency well. Two
thick broken lines chart the general equilibrium benchmarks – the black
horizontal line at 427 for the steady state or infinite horizon equilibrium level of
public good, and the curved green line for the finite horizon level with expected
ending stock of public good at 310. 15,16 The same conventions are used to depict
data in the other panels of Figure 3 and in Figures 4 through 7.

14

Mann-Whitney U-test comparing average contributions per run confirm this, as all p-values are
below 0.05 for four individual tests comparing each of T1, T2, T3, and T4 to T0.
15
Since the end of the session was announced to be uncertain (1/6th chance of ending after period
25, 26, 27, 28, 29, and 30), the finite horizon equilibrium predictions are given in expected values
(see Appendix A).
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Insert Figure 3 about here
In all four sessions of Treatment 1 (top left panel), the stock of public
good gradually but steadily declined over the 25 rounds from the starting level to
a range of 355-402 (average 381), which is half-way between the steady state and
finite horizon optima of 427 and 310, respectively.
The top right panel in Figure 3 shows the four runs of Treatment 2 with
tax rate fixed at 21.5% but starting with 50 percent of the optimal stock of public
good (213.5). In all sessions of Treatment 2, the stock of public good rose steadily
to a narrow 357-366 range (average 362). So far we can conclude that with the tax
rate exogenously fixed at the optimum level, the stock of the public good
converges near the midpoint between the finite- and infinite-horizon levels. This
holds irrespective of the starting stock of the public good.
In the bottom left panel of Figure 3 the six sessions of Treatment 3, with
endogenously determined tax rates and starting with optimal stock of public good,
show the stock of PG to decline over time to the range of 352-404 (average of
371). In the bottom right panel, the six sessions of Treatment 4, with
endogenously determined tax rates but starting from half the optimal level of
public good are presented. The stock of public good tended to rise to the range of
273-406 (average of 344).
Starting from the optimal level, the stock of public good tended to decline
to the neighborhood of 370 irrespective of whether the tax rate was fixed or
determined by vote by participants. Starting from the suboptimal level, the stock

16
In an unconstrained environment, one would expect the finite horizon equilibrium stock of
public good to be exhausted to zero at the end of the session. Since the stock of public good
depreciates at a constant rate of 10% per period, exhaustion close to zero at the end would require
lower investment in early periods. The lower payoff in those periods prevents the optimal level of
public good from being driven to exhaustion at the end even in a finite-horizon economy.
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of public good rose gradually to the neighborhood of 360 irrespective of whether
the tax rate was fixed or determined by vote by participants. Hypotheses IIIa,
compares the final stock of the PG between treatments where the stock started at
the optimum vs. half of the optimum. The two Mann-Whitney U-tests deliver pvalues of 0.248 and 0.423, for T1 vs. T2, and T3 vs. T4, respectively. Hence the
null Hypothesis IIIa is not rejected.
Hypothesis IIIb compares the final stock of the PG between treatments
where the tax rate is fixed at the optimum or is set endogenously. The two MannWhitney U-tests deliver p-values of 0.286 and 0.831, for T1 vs. T3, and T2 vs.
T4, respectively. Hence the null Hypothesis IIIb of no difference in the final
stocks of public goods under two tax policies is not rejected. It seems reasonable
to infer, on the basis of these 20 independent sessions of experimental economies,
that the stock of public good tends towards the range midway between the
infinite-horizon and finite-horizon optima.
Finally, the two left panels of Figure 2 show, in thin chain-dotted lines, the
time paths of the stock of public good in two Treatment 0 economies in which
taxation was replaced by individual VACs. In these two sessions, the stock of
public goods declined steadily and sharply to 147 and 170 respectively, at the end
of period 25. This is much lower than levels observed in any period of any of the
20 economies with taxation. Null hypothesis IIIc of equality of the final stock of
PG between VAC treatment T0 and each of T1-T4 is rejected. The p-values of the
Mann-Whitney U-tests are 0.046 for T3 and T4, N=8, and 0.064 for T1 and T2,
N=6. The data confirm that the final stock of the PG is lower in T0 with VAC
than in any other treatment. These results are consistent with those obtained in
voluminous experimental literature on partial equilibrium economies in which
public goods are financed by VACs.
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A comparison of the data in the four panels of Figure 3 reveals some
differences but also strong similarities. The stock of public good showed greater
dispersion across multiple independent sessions of identical economies when tax
rates are endogenous, instead of being fixed (standard deviation of final PG stock
across sessions is only 3.86 in T2, but 47.52 in T4, p<0.01 on F-test of equality of
variances; no significant difference between T1 and T3). This rejects hypothesis
IIId for T2 vs. T4.

4.3. Efficiency (Figure 4)
The total points earned by all subjects as a percentage of the number of
points they would have earned if the economies had achieved the infinite horizon
(steady state) general equilibrium outcomes is defined as the efficiency of these
economies. Points earned by each individual are the private goods consumed plus
the stock of the public good divided by four. In equilibrium roughly half of the
points are earned from consumption and the other half from the public good.
Period-by-period efficiency for the 20 sessions are presented in the four
panels of Figure 4. Note, that efficiencies for individual periods and the finite
horizon benchmark (shown in thick broken curved line) can exceed 100% in some
periods, because agents can earn a high but unsustainable payoff by consuming,
thereby depleting the stock of the public good over time.
Insert Figure 4 about here
Visual inspection shows that efficiencies start lower in T2 and T4 than in
T1 and T3 due to the lower initial stock of the PG. Also, efficiencies in T3 seem
to be higher than in other treatments. In Treatment 1, with fixed tax rate and stock
of the public good starting at the optimum, efficiencies started close to 100
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percent and declined gradually, albeit noisily, to the range of 77-86 percent with
an average of 83 percent. With suboptimal start (Treatment 2 in the top right
panel) efficiencies were at 81 percent at the beginning and 83 percent at the end
of the sessions. With endogenous tax rates and optimal start (Treatment 3; bottom
left panel) efficiencies remained in the 90s throughout, with the maximum of
101.5 percent in the last period. Only with endogenous tax rates and suboptimal
start (Treatment 4 in bottom right panel) did efficiencies show a clear rising trend
from an average of 74 percent in period 1 to 91.5 percent in the last period.
Testing Hypothesis IVa with Mann-Whitney U-Tests (N=10) on the
average efficiency of the last five periods we found no significant difference
between T1 and T2 (p=1), but significantly higher efficiency in T3 than in T4
(p=0.016), which can be attributed to the higher initial stock of the PG in T3
which allows for higher efficiency.
Hypothesis IVb, comparing efficiency in treatments with tax rate fixed at
the GE optimum of 21.5% and endogenous choice of taxes reveals significant
differences, as efficiency is markedly higher in T3 than in T1 (p=0.011) and also
marginally higher in T4 than in T2 (p=0.088). Hence the endogenous choice of
taxes resulted in higher efficiency levels (through marginally higher stocks of the
PG and marginally higher production of private goods, see next section) than with
a preset tax rate.
To examine hypothesis IVc, the chain-dotted lines in the two left panels
for T0 economies, with VAC, are hardly distinguishable from the lines for
efficiency of T1 economies. However, efficiency in T3 was significantly higher
than in T0 (Mann-Whitney U-test, p=0.046, N=6). The comparatively high (but
unsustainable) efficiency in T0 resulted from high consumption of the private
good, as the stock of the public good was run down because of low contributions.
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4.4. Production of Private Goods (Figure 5)
Private goods in the hands of subjects can either be consumed or used for
production of more private goods for the next period. Figure 5 shows the
development of total production of private goods in each session. Production fell
in all of the treatments, probably least (and late) in T3. Total production was
similar in all treatments. This is remarkable, as it is often argues that taxation
discourages production. This does obviously not hold in our experiment, as total
production is actually highest in T3 where taxes are set endogenously. The thick
broken lines for GE production in infinite and finite economies overlap at 2170
except in the final period when the finite period production drops.
Figure 5 about here
In all economies, the level of production was near the optimum (2170) at
the outset, but declined over the 25 rounds to the neighborhood of 1,500 with
considerably variation across sessions as well as across rounds. 17 A reason for this
could be the choice of the concave production function (80*k0.25) in which the
extra output from positive deviations from optimal input (54 units of the private
good)

is much smaller than the loss of

output from comparable negative deviations. Thus, while the average input is
close to the optimum (average of 53.2 in the first ten periods; 44.8 overall),
average output is lower due to dispersion of inputs across individual subjects.
Also, optimal production would fall sharply in periods 26 to 30 in the finite17

Note that production is also at 2170 in the finite-horizon-benchmark in periods 1-25, as
subjects need to produce units of the private good in order to earn money and be able to consume
and produce units for the next period. As the rules specify that there will certainly be at least 25
periods, production is at the long-term optimum of 2170 throughout periods 1-25. After period 25
production quickly and steadily drops.
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horizon benchmark. Thus, the decline observed in the experiments is also
theoretically justifiable. Also note that while private good production drops
substantially throughout the session, the concavity of the public goods production
function implies that not many public goods are lost at the margin
We test for differences in average production across all periods (rather
than only the last five), as total production is relevant in each period and as the
initial stock of PG should be irrelevant for production.
To test Hypothesis Va we run pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests between
each treatments T1 vs. T3 and T2 vs. T4. T3, which a high initial stock of the PG
and endogenously set tax stands out as the treatment with the highest average
production, which is significantly higher than production in T1 (but also higher
than in T2 and T4, each difference significant with p<0.02). The other treatment
with endogenously set taxes, T4, had the second highest average production,
which was significantly higher than in T2 (p=0.011). We conclude that production
was higher in treatments where subjects had control over the taxes they pay
compared to those treatments where taxes were set exogenously.
To test Hypothesis Vb we run pairwise Mann-Whitney U-tests between T0
and each of T1 to T4. We find no significant differences for T1 and T4, but
significantly higher production in T2 and T3 (p-values 0.064 and 0.046,
respectively).
Hence, we can conclude that in our setting taxes did not deter production,
when compared to an VAC-regime. When comparing tax-treatments subjects
produced more when they had control over their taxes.

4.5. Share of Points Earned from the Public Good (Figure 6)
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We set the variables in the game in a way to ensure that in equilibrium
roughly one half of points are earned from the public good and the other half from
the consumption of the private good. Figure 6 shows the percentage of points
actually earned from the public good (with the remainder earned from
consumption of private goods).
Figure 6 about here
In T1 and T3, where the stock of the public good started at the optimum,
the share of points earned remained close to the GE level of 50 percent
throughout. In T2 and T4, by contrast, the stock of the public good started at half
of optimum, and the share of points earned from the public good was initially
below one third. However, through high-enough taxes the stock of the public
good grew over time and its contribution to total points earned rose to roughly 50
percent in the second half of the experiment in both T2 and T4.
Testing Hypotheses VIa and VIb on the averages of the last five periods
we find that among the tax treatments T1 has a significantly higher ratio from the
PG than T2 (rejecting null VIa) and also than T3 (rejecting null VIb). The higher
ratio in T1 is not due to a higher stock of PG, but due to lower production of the
private good in this treatment especially compared to T3. We do, however, find
no differences between T3 vs. T4 and T2 vs. T4.
As for Hypothesis VIc: The thin chain-dotted lines in Figure 6 show the
two VAC-runs. They illustrate nicely what happened in this treatment: as the
stock of the public good drew down due to low contributions, the share of points
earned from the public good fell from 45 percent in the first period to 22 percent
in the last period. Differences between this treatment and the other four are
significant (as far as they can be with only two runs in T0, with p-values of 0.046
in T0 vs. each of T3 and T4, respectively, and p=0.064 in T0 vs. T1 and T2).
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4.6. Supplementary Treatment where subjects choose between taxation and VAC
by vote (Figure 7)
Gürerk et al. (2006) introduced “voting by feet” dynamics in a traditional
public goods setting. Two institutions ran simultaneously in their experiment.
Both institutions had VACs, but punishment (sanctioning) was possible in only
one of them. They found that contributions in the sanctioning institution
converged towards 100%, and to 0% in the sanction-free environment. While
initially some 70% of subjects chose to be in the sanction-free institutions, they
gradually switched until 90% chose the sanctioning institution in the last few
periods of the session, where high contributions and high earnings prevailed. With
high contributions, sanctioning itself was rarely needed.
Real societies can, through vote or revolution, choose their institutions.
We capture part of this process in supplementary treatment T5 where subjects
decided every five periods by majority vote whether to finance the public good
through VACs or taxes. Subjects first experienced five periods with each of the
two institutions T0 and T3. Then the initial endowments were reissued and one of
the two institutions was chosen by a majority vote. The vote was repeated every
five periods. We conducted four runs of this treatment for a total of 24 votes on
choosing the institution.
The main result is that in 23 out of 24 majority votes subjects chose taxes
over VACs. 18 Most of voting decisions were not close, with 7.6 of 10 votes for
taxation on average, and a slight upward trend over time (7.3 in the first vote; 8.0
in the last). Only one decision (the third vote in run 3) favored VACs by 6:4 vote.
18

This is nicely in line with e.g. Robbett (2014), who showed that when allowed to vote on taxes
subjects in an experiment converged towards their respective optimum level.
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One other vote in run 3 was a 5-5 tie; it was randomly resolved by computer in
favor of taxes. We infer that with some experience and given the choice subjects
understand that a system with perfectly enforced taxes makes them better off.
The four panels of Figure 7 present detailed results for four variables in T5
(stock of public good, tax rate, efficiency, and points earned from the public
good) by period number. Besides the two thick dashed lines for equilibrium, two
chain dotted lines for voluntary contribution economies have been added for
comparison. Overall the results look similar to what we found in the other
treatments, especially T3. Only in one run did the stock of the public good decline
markedly from period 11 to 16. This is run 3, where subjects voted 6:4 for
implementing VAC. The effect is visible in several panels of Figure 7: in the top
left panel the stock of the public good dropped from 397 in period 10 to 314 after
period 16. Afterwards, with taxes reinstated by 7:3 vote, and a comparatively high
tax rate of 25 percent, the stock of the public good rose back to 385 by period 25.
Insert Figure 7 about here
In panel 2 (top right) tax rates (respectively the voluntary contributions
rates) are displayed. Tax rates were at a similar level as in T3 and T4. The five
periods with VACs in run 3 are highlighted with diamond markers and an
unbroken line. Average contributions ranged from 5.1 to 9.8 percent – similar to
the rates observed in T0, but markedly lower than under taxation regime.
Efficiency, displayed in panel 3, bottom left, developed similarly to what we saw
in T1 to T4. Finally, the bottom right panel shows the development of total
production of private goods, which is similar to what we observed in T3.
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5. Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Public goods decisions are made in rich institutional settings. States
evolved over centuries by enforcing weights and measures, commercial codes,
accounting rules, law and order, and tax collection. In this study we take it as a
given that the structure of government is able to serve these functions.
We report on a novel laboratory experiment to explore the suitability of
setting taxes through democratic voting to pay for public goods in a general
equilibrium economy. We find that the four main treatments with finite horizon
experimental economies sustain public goods between the finite- and infinitehorizon optima, and at 90 to 100 percent efficiency. Both the efficiency and the
production of private goods are higher when the rate of taxation is determined by
vote instead of being fixed at the GE optimum. Production of private goods is also
not harmed by taxation. In the two treatments with voting, taxes remain at an
intermediate level, converging neither to zero nor to 100%. Irrespective of
whether we start at 50% or 100% of the optimum, the stock of the public good
converges to the same level between the finite- and infinite-horizon optima. This
holds also in the supplemental treatment T5 in which 23 out of 24 times subjects
choose taxation over a voluntary contribution (VAC) regime by a majority vote.
In all treatments except the one with VACs the ending stock of public goods
exceeds the finite horizon optimum.
Our results suggest that the important social problem of financing public
goods can be addressed, fairly and efficiency, by societies through taxes set by
democratic vote. Dependence on voluntary contributions among large groups may
be too unreliable a basis for providing services essential to their productivity,
social cohesion, even survival. In the experiment the level of VACs is
significantly lower than the level of tax contribution in any given period. While
we know voluntary contribution to public goods rapidly deteriorates in many
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designs, it is important to establish the result in this design, particularly given the
concavity of public goods production.
Still, voluntary contribution mechanisms have the inherent appeal of being
decentralized, and thus insulated from tyranny. Taxation, representing centralized
power and a centralized enforcement mechanism, has historical associations with
oppression. Democratic government and taxation based on popular voting attempt
to balance the consequences of centralization by fairness. Our experimental
results suggest that such a reasonable balance is achievable for financing of public
goods and services through democratic mechanisms. We find that the majority of
subjects voted 23 times out of 24 to favor a system with taxes over VACs.
Subjects cut the tax rates marginally as the sessions progressed towards
the end when the remaining stock of public good is worthless. They made up for
lower taxation by saving more of their private goods, so that tax proceeds
remained about the same regardless of whether taxes were set exogenously at the
ex ante optimal level or set endogenously by a vote; and increased efficiency by
doing so. This powerful result raises interesting questions for future research; e.g.,
is it the tax level itself or exogenous tax policy that induces suboptimal dissaving?
As a limitation we note that our sample of experimental subjects (Austrian
students) might be more receptive to taxation than other populations, especially in
the U.S. We leave the answer to this question to a future study with cross-country
subjects.
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Table 1: Experimental Design
Initial Level of Public Good
Regimes for Public Good Provision
100 percent of Optimal
50 percent of Optimal
Voluntary anonymous contributions Treatment 0: 2 sessions*
Fixed at 21.5%
Treatment 1: 4 sessions** Treatment 2:4 sessions
Taxation
Tax rate set by vote
Treatment 3: 6 sessions
Treatment 4: 6 sessions
Vote on system
Treatment 5: 4 sessions***
*Voluntary contributions specified in units of money in one session and in percent
of wealth in the other.
**Two of these four sessions permitted 0 inputs to private good production; all
other sessions of the experiment required a minimum of 1 unit of input.
*** subjects decide by majority vote whether they implement a system with
voluntary anonymous contributions or with taxes.

Table 2: Experimental Parameters and Design
Parameters
Number of Agents
n
10
Initial money endowment of agents
m
4,700
Initial pvt. good endowment of agents
a
217
Agents’ pvt. Good production function
f(k)
80*k0.25
Single period agent payoff
u(x, G)
x + G/4
Session agent payoff
Sum of period-wise payoffs
Initial government public good endow.
G
427 (T1, T3) or 213.5 (T2, T4)
Initial government money endowment
M
13,000
Government’s public good prod. F(k)
2*k0.5
function
Natural rate of discount
β
1
Depreciation rate (per period)
η
0.1
Terminal value of public good
0
Session termination
Announced: random btw. periods 25 and 30
Actual: always ended after vote in period 26
Equilibrium Outcomes
Price of private goods
Per capita production of pvt. good
Per capita purchase of pvt. good
Per capita consumption of pvt. good
Per capita pvt. Good into production
Production of public good

p

27.67
217
170
116 (68.27% of 170)
54 (31.73% of 170)
42.7
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Table 3: Summary of Hypotheses and Tests
Hypothesis

Variable

Ia

Tax rates

Ib

Tax rates

II

Provision
for PG
Final Level
of PG
Final Level
of PG
Final Level
of PG
Var of
Level of PG
Efficiency

IIIa
IIIb
IIIc
IIId
IVa

Null
Alternative
ETR = Equil.
ETR < Equil.
ETR = 0
ETR > 0
ETR = VAC
ETR > VAC
HIE =LIE

T1 vs.
T0

T2 vs.
T0

T3 vs.
T0

T4 vs.
T0

Reject.
p<0.01

Reject.
p<0.01

Reject.
p<0.01

Reject.
p<0.01

ETR = FTR
ETR = VAC
ETR > VAC

HIE =LIE
HIE > LIE
IVb
Efficiency
ETR = FTR
ETR < FTR
IVc
Efficiency
Tax = VAC
Tax > VAC
Va
Pvt. Good
ETR = FTR
Production ETR <> FTR
Vb
Pvt. Good
Tax = VAC
Production Tax <> VAC
VIa
% Earn
HIE =LIE
from PG
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VAC =Voluntary anonymous contributions
HIE/LIE = High/Low initial endowment of public good
FTR = fixed (at optimum level) tax rate
Var Level of PG = Variation of final level of public good across sessions of the same treatment
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Figure 1: Time line of a period in the experiment
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Figure 2: Evolution of Tax Rates over Time

T1: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good at optimum

T2: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good below optimum
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Figure 3: Stock of Public Good in Economies Grouped by Four Types of Sessions

T2: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good below optimum
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Figure 4: Efficiency of the Economies with GE(Infinite) being the Benchmark

T2: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good below optimum
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Figure 5: Total Production of Private Goods in the Economies

T1: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good at optimum

T2: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good below optimum
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Figure 6: Percentage of Utility Earned from the Public Good (rather than from Consumption of Private Goods)

T2: Tax rate fixed, starting level of public good below optimum
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Figure 7: Data for T5 where subjects voted on the system to be implemented. Notation follows that of Figures 2 to 6.

Panel 1: development of stock of public good in T5
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APPENDIX A – explanation of online material
As supporting material for this paper we provide two MS EXCEL worksheets, one for infinite horizon, one for a
finite horizon of 30 periods. In both worksheets all relevant input variables can be varied in cells E2 to E17. The
respective notation can be found in cells A2 to A17. Especially noteworthy in the infinite horizon setting are the
tax rate (E7) and the consumption rate (E12) as these are the two variables for which we optimized by use of the
solver function of MS EXCEL.
In rows 19 to 24 (22 to 28 in the finite setting) the sell-all market is modeled, with period 1 in column E, and
subsequent periods to the right, up to period 20 in the infinite setting and period 30 in the finite setting. Right
below, are the productions of private and public goods, again from period 1 (column E) to period 20 (30 in the
finite setting).
Several graphs from Columns H to AD illustrate the results and their sensitivity to variations in the input
variables. Figures 7 and 8 give screenshots of part of the respective excel sheets, which would be continued in
further rows down and further columns to the right.
Figure 7: MS EXCEL screenshot for model with infinite horizon. The Graph in the top rows of columns I to N
shows total utility as a function of consumption rate (E12) and tax rate (E7).

Figure 8: MS EXCEL screenshot for model with finite horizon of 30 periods. Here the tax rate (E7) and
consumption rate (E12) are no longer fixed for several periods, but instead change from period to period. The
respective values are displayed in rows 19 and 20.
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APPENDIX B: Instructions
Dear participant: Welcome to the experiment. Please do not talk to any other subject for the duration of the
experiment.
You are one of ten subjects populating a small economy with money and two kinds of goods: one private and
one public good. As subjects, you will produce, sell, buy, and consume the private good. The government
(played by the experimenter) will tax the income of subjects (from sale of the private good) and use the
proceeds to buy some of the private good, to be used to produce the public good. The tax rate will be either
fixed, or determined by the vote of the ten subjects once every five periods. Your earnings for each period
depend on the quantity of private good you consume, and the quantity of the public good provided by the
government for benefit of all in that period.
Money and Goods
There is money and two kinds of goods in the economy:
•
•

A private good produced, sold, bought and consumed by the participating subjects; some the private
good is also bought by the government and used to produce the public good.
The public good (e.g., a public facility) which depreciates at the rate of 10 percent per round. The
government uses tax collected from subjects to replenish the depreciating stock of public good.

In round 1 each subject starts with 4,700 units of money and 217 units of the private good. The government
starts with 13,000 units of money and 427 (213.5 in half of the runs) units of the public good.
At the beginning of each round, all private good produced in (and carried over from) the preceding round) is
sold in a market. Thus, the initial private good endowment of 217 units in the hands of each subject (for a total
of 2,170) is sold at the start of round 1.
Money serves only a means of exchange in this economy, but it has no role in savings, etc. An amount of
money is given to you at the beginning of the session, and any balance left over at the end of the session has no
value to you. Each round all money you have (either initial endowment or earned from sale of goods the round
before) is spent for the purchase of goods at the start of each round. No borrowing is possible.
At the start of a period all money held by the government and individuals is tendered to buy units of the private
good. In the first period 2,170 units are sold for a total of 60,000 units of money.
Total agent and government bids in money = 60,000/2,170 (total number of units of private good) = 27.65.
These numbers will change in subsequent rounds.

Each individual buys 170 units and earns 217*27.65=6,000 units of money. Your first decision is how many of
these 170 units you invest into production for the next period, with the remainder being consumed this period.
Your money income (6,000 in the first period) is taxed by the government at a rate set by all subjects through a
vote (see details below).
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On the left side of the Screen 2 you learn the total money bid for private good, the resulting price, the units
bought by the government, and government’s tax revenue (all of which is spent to buy private goods in the
following round). On the right side of Screen 2 you see how many units you bought, your spending, income,
tax, and the initial and final money balances (the latter to be carried over to the following round).
Screen 2

Out of the units of private good you bought, you have to decide on how many you wish to consume, and how
many you wish to invest to produce private goods to be sold during the next round. The following equation and
chart show the relationship between the units you invest and the units produced:
UNITS OF THE PRIVATE GOOD PRODUCED = 80*(UNITS INVESTED)0.25.

Units of goods produced

Note, for example, that investing 1 unit produces 80 units; investing 40 units produces 201.19 units.
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The government starts with a stock of 427 units of the public good. This stock depreciates by 10% each round,
like, for example, roads deteriorate. To maintain or upgrade the public good the government taxes the subjects’
income (from sales of goods) at the selected rate. All tax receipts are used to buy the private good and all
private goods are used to produce new units of the public good according to the following function:
UNITS OF THE PUBLIC GOOD PRODUCED = 2*(UNITS OF PRIVATE GOOD INVESTED)0.5.

Units of public good produced
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Taxes
All individual income (proceeds from sale of private good) will be taxed at a flat tax rate (which is either fixed
by the experimenter in advance, or is set by the vote of ten subjects). In the latter case, every five rounds (i.e., at
the beginnings of rounds 1, 6, 11, 16, etc.) each subject is asked to submit his/her suggested percent rate of
taxation to be applicable to all ten subjects. You are free to suggest any integer number between zero (no tax)
and 100 (everything taken by the government) as the percent tax rate. The computer collects the suggested tax
rates from the ten subjects, sorts them from highest to lowest, and sets the median (average of the 5th and the 6th
suggested rates) as the tax rate for all subjects. The selected tax rate is announced, and it remains in effect for
five rounds until the next tax rate is determined though another vote. (In half of the treatments the tax rate was
fixed at 21.5. percent and no vote was carried out)
Points earned
The points you earn in each round are calculated as:
POINTS = CONSUMPTION OF PRIVATE GOOD + PUBLIC GOOD/4.
For example, if you consume 60 units of private good and the government provides 200 units of public good,
you earn 60 + 200/4 = 110 points in that period. Both higher private good consumption as well as higher stock
of the public good increase your earnings. Chart 1 and Table 1 show the number of points resulting from
various combinations of private good consumption and public good provision by government.
(Insert Chart 1)
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History screen:
After all subjects have entered their consumption/investment decisions, computer carries out all the
calculations, and a history screen provides a round-by-round overview of the results (the accounting of public
goods on the left, your consumption and production of goods in the middle, the points you earn during the
round on the right, and the summary of the round at the bottom.
History Screen

Final payment:
There is 1/6 chance that the experiment will last for 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, or 30 rounds. The actual number of
rounds in the session will be determined randomly before we start, but will not be announced to you until the
session ends.
The points earned during all rounds are added up (column “Total points” in the History Screen). Your takehome payment in euro is TOTAL POINTS / 200. For example, if the experiment ends in round 28 and you
earned a total of 3,000 points during these 28 rounds, your take-home payment is 3,000/200 = 15 Euros.

(Appendix C: not for publication; inserted as a separate PDF file for editors. The source Karatzas et al. 2006 is
referenced in Section 2 of the paper and included in the list of references).
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